A. V. Gorokhov. Co-Optation of the Opposition in Regional Elections in Russia: Factors of Influence (Evidence of Campaigns 2019‒2023)

https://doi.org/10.15507/2413-1407.033.202501.091-103
EDN: https://elibrary.ru/pooena
УДК / UDC 324(470+571)

Abstract

Introduction. Political processes in Russia’s regions have attracted the attention of researchers for a period. They are not the least interested in regional elections to parliaments, which analyze not only the balance of power between political parties, but also the phenomenon of co-optation, i.e. granting leadership positions to the opposition in exchange for the status quo. The available studies show contradictory results when testing the factors influencing cooptation, which are mostly institutional factors of regional politics and career characteristics of the deputies. The aim of this article is to test the influence of these factors on cooptation.

Materials and Methods. The research materials are electoral results of the systemic opposition (represented by the CPRF, LDPR and Just Russia). Regression analysis was used as a research method based on the results of 89 parliamentary elections 2019‒2023 as the most relevant. Based on the available research, the selected variables of influence on co-optation were divided into institutional (the role of the head of the region and features of the regional parliament) and personal (political or business experience).

Results. It was revealed that the most significant institutional factors were the features of the structure of the regional parliament (the number of leadership positions and the number of seats). Among personal characteristics, the main role is played by party experience and previous leadership in the previous parliament. The experience of deputies in business was also significant.

Discussion and Conclusion. The results confirm that the decision on co-optation is most often based on the previous career experience of parliamentarians, and these personal characteristics are key ones compared to the institutional features of regional politics. The results obtained, in addition to the research interest, may be in demand by regional branches of parties, their functionaries and representatives in legislative bodies to understand the factors of performance improvement.

Keywords: regional parliament, systemic opposition, parliamentary consensus, opposition co-optation, regression analysis

Conflict of interests. The author declares no conflict of interest.

For citation: Gorokhov A.V. Co-Optation of the Opposition in Regional Elections in Russia: Factors of Influence (Evidence of Campaigns 2019‒2023). Russian Journal of Regional Studies. 2025;33(1):91–103. https://doi.org/10.15507/2413-1407.033.202501.091-103

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About the author:

Aleksandr V. Gorokhov, PhD Student, Faculty of Social Sciences, National Research University “Higher School of Economics” (20 Myasnitskaya St., Moscow 101000, Russian Federation), ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3118-9403, Researcher ID: ABF-5192-2021, SPIN-code: 3650-9330, avgorohov@bk.ru

Availability of data and materials. The datasets used and/or analyzed during the current study are available from the author on reasonable request.

The author has read and approved the final manuscript.

Submitted 14.08.2024; revised 01.11.2024; accepted 16.12.2024.